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ExPosuRE TO DANGER fn SPORTs
VOLUNTARY EXPOSURE TO UNNECESSARY DANGER
IN SPORTS AND PASTIMES
Accident insurance policies as a rule contain a clause ex-
empting the insurer from liability where injury is caused by
"voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger." Cases involving
the construction of such clauses have often come before the
courts, however, there are comparatively few decisions on the
question by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
The early case of Kentucky Life & Accident Insurance Co.
v. Franklin1 seems to have gone on the question of whether the
insured had exercised due diligence. In that case the plaintiff,
who had an accident insurance policy with the defendant
company, was injured while hunting. At the time of the acci-
dent he was sitting on a fence with a shot gun in his hands,
with one or both hammers cocked, when a rail turned and plain-
tiff fell in such a way as to discharge the gun. His occupation
in the policy was given as a "grocer with desk and counter
duties." Defendant contended that as plaintiff was engaged
in hunting at the time there was a change of occupation and
consequently it was not liable. The court denied this conten-
tion and said that defendant in order to avoid liability on that
ground must show that plaintiff was engaged in hunting as an
occupation at the time of the accident. The court considered
the point as to whether the plaintiff was in the exercise of due
diligence at the time. It said: "Further, we can not say as
matter of law, that the insured was guilty of "want of due
diligence for his safety and protection." Nothing is said in the
opinion about a clause in the policy relative to exposure to un-
necessary risk and the decision -is based upon the exercise of
due care on the part of insured. Accident policies at first did.
not contain such a clause.
In Travelers' Insurance .Co. v. Clark2 the policy contained
a clause to the effect "that the insurance did not cover death
or injury resulting wholly or in part from voluntary exposure
to unnecessary danger." In that case the insured went to sleep
on a plank placed above the boilers of a steamboat and near
the 'safety valve. He had been warned not to do so by the boat's
officers. The safety valve blew off during the night and insured
1102 Ky. 512, 43 S. W. 709.
2109 Ky. 351, 59 S. W. 7.
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died from injuries received from the escaping steam. The court
said: "To enable appellant to escape liability under the pro-
vision of the policy relied on, it is essential that it should show
that the assured knew of and realized the danger to him in sleep-
ing in such close proximity to the safety valve, and that with
such knowledge he purposely and consciously exposed himself
to such risk."
The necessity of the assured's realizing the danger is
further emphasized by the Court of Appeals in the case of
Campbell v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.3 where it stated that
"voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger" did not preclude
the beneficiary unless assured realized the danger to which he
exposed himself in making the assault. Assured in this case had
been guilty of bringing on a fight which resulted in his death
and the lower court had erroneously instructed the jury to
find for the insurance company if the slayer acted in his neces-
sary or apparently necessary self-defense in killing assured.
Another decision in which the Kentucky Court of Appeals
sustained a finding that insured had not voluntarily exposed
himself to unnecessary danger within the terms of ar accident
policy was Union Casualty & Surety Co. v. Goddard.4 The in-
sured was injured while atempting to clean a loaded gun.
These decisions are in line with the decisions of other states,
that there is a distinction between a voluntary act and a volun-
tary exposure to danger and that hidden danger may exist, but
that exposure to it without knowledge of such danger does not
constitute a voluntary exposure to such danger;5 unless the in-
sured is guilty of such reckless and wanton conduct that it could
be held to amount to voluntary exposure to danger.6
Cases involving the question of unnecessary exposure to
danger within the meaning of life and accident insurance
policies, very often come before the courts, where the injury
complained of has been received while insured was engaged in
some sport or pastime. The cases uniformly hold that insured
will not be barred from recovery when injured while taking
part in ordinary sports and pastimes. The Iowa court held
that the fact that assured was drowned while fishing in a boat
3109 Ky. 661, 60 S. W. 492.
4 25 Ky. L. R. 1035, 76 S. W. 832.
"Hein v. Iflinois Comnercial Men's Assoc., 117 N. E. 63 (IlM.).
8 Carpenter v. American Accident Co., 46 S. C. 541.
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on a dark night in a dangerous place did not prevent recovery.
The court said: "Fishing as a pastime or business, is not in-
cluded, in terms, and it could not well be said but that he had a
right to go upon the water in a boat to fislh; that is, such fishing
could not be regarded, in itself, as 'unnecessary danger.' Nor
do we believe that the contract contemplates that going in a
boat to fish in a dark night, is such danger in the absence of
other facts." . . . "Before he could voluntarily expose
himself to danger, he m-qst know of the danger, and it does not
appear that he know, when on the water that he was near the
tree, to be in danger because of it.' "7
Several eases of injuries received while hunting have been
tried and the courts have uniformly held that going hunting
was not exposing oneself to unnecessary danger. In a North
Dakota cases the assured went hunting for prairie chickens
during the closed season and was injured by the discharge of
his gun. The court said: "It will hardly be insisted that one
who, in the ordinary way, hunts for game, has by such an act
exposed himself to unnecessary danger, within the meaning of
such provision in an insurance policy. Nor can it be said that
the plaintiff voluntarily exposed himself to unnecessary danger
by assaying to scale a bank, or by attempting to draw himself
up the bank with his left hand, while the loaded gun was held
in his right hand. We cannot say that this act was one which
reasonable men would pronounce dangerous. To go through a
dense thicket with the hammer of a gun raised, and the muzzle
pointed towards one, would be to voluntarily expose oneself to
unnecessary danger." The Kansas court in Wildey Casualty Co.
v. Sheppard,9 in passing upon a case where insured was injured
while rabbit hunting, observed that "the ordinary use of a gun
while hunting can hardly be regarded as a voluntary exposure
to unnecessary danger." The Michigan court considered the
question of whether one who was injured while playing indoor
baseball could recover under a policy of insurance which con-
tained an exemption where injury was due to exposure to un-
necessary danger. Insured ran beyond first base and stopped
1Collins v. Bankers' Accident Ins. Co., 96 Ia. 216, 64 N. W. 778.
8 Cornwell v. Fraternal Accident Assoc. of America, 6 N. D. 24, 69
N. W. 191.
61 Kan. 351, 59 Pac. 361.
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himself by putting out a hand and foot against a wall as he and
others were accustomed to do. Recovery was allowed.' 0
On the other hand, the Wisconsin court reversed a finding
for an insured who was injured while hunting. He drew a loaded
gun towards him through or over a wire fence and discharged it
in so doing. The court said there was present that negligence
which constitutes an unnecessary exposure to danger." Also the
Massachusetts court sustained a finding of a lower court for the
insurance company in the case of Morse v. Commercial Travel-
ers' Eastern Accident Association.12 The insured and a com-
panion went out on a lake in a canoe after having been warned
by several guides that it was dangerous to do so. The court said:
"The case is not one of a catastrophe resulting from an error of
judgment in regard to a matter concerning which prudent men
might differ, but it involved a disregard of warnings which,
under the circumstances, the master was warranted in finding
the insured was bound, in the exercise of due care, to heed, and
of a hazardous exposure to conditions of wind and weather which
ordinary prudence and foresight forbade." The same court had
at an earlier time rendered judgment in a case involving recov-
ery under an insurance policy which contained a similar exemp-
tion, Smith v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.' 3 The insured was in-
jured while riding in a steeplechase. The court in denying re-
covery observed: "We do not mean to say that an accident
policy containing a provision like that contained in the policy in
this case against voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger de-
bars the insured from recovery if injured while engaged in the
common sports and amusements. But in steeplechase riding the
liability to accident is much greater than in ordinary sports and
amusements. The fact that the race in which plaintiff was in-
jured was for amateurs makes no difference."
From these cases it seems clear that participation in ordi-
nary sports and pastimes will not be a bar to a recovery for in-
juries received while so engaged, but that taking part in sports
involving more than ordinary hazards with knowledge that such
"Hunt v. United States Accid. Assoc., 146 Mich. 521, 109 N. W. 1042.
Sargent v. Central Insurance Co., 112 Wis. 29, 87 N. W. 796.
"212 Mass. 140, 98 N. E. 599.
1185 Mass. 74, 69 N. 1. 1059.
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sports are hazardous, will prevent recovery under insurance
policies which exempt the insurer from liability where the in-
sured voluntarily exposes himself to unnecessary danger.
W. LLwis ROBERTs.
DOES THE PLACE WHERE A LOST AIRTICLE IS FOUND
DETERMINE .THE RIGHTS OF THE FINDER?
In Silcott v. Louisville Trust Co.,1 a liberty bond was found
on the floor of the safety vault department of a trust company
by a renter of a safety box. The room was one of sev-
eral immediately adjoining the vault and maintained for
the convenience of those renting safety vault boxes. There were
a number of such private rooms, each of which had a door enter-
ing into it with a bolt on the inside for the safety of those who
desired to inspect the contents of their look boxes at their leisure.
The vault department was not accessible through the general
offices of the trust company, but through a separate door opening
into the department, which door was kept closed and locked, and
was opened by an attendant only when admission was desired by
a customer of such department. It was held that although the
bond had been found on the floor, the trust company's right to
its custody was superior to that of the finder. The court said
that it made no difference whether it was found on the floor or
on a desk, thus seemingly deciding that whether the property,
was lost or mislaid did not affect the question. The decision is
based on the conclusion that the trust company, because of the
purpose of the room and its semi-private nature, was the cus-
todian of any valuables that might be left there, and that there
was a fiduciary relationship existing between the trust company
and its patrons which imposed a duty on the company to pre-
serve and protect their property. The court said: "Many cases
appear in the books about lost chattels, and the distinction be-
tween lost and mislaid chattels has often been pointed out, but
we find nowhere a case presenting the precise question here pro-
sented.
"If the bond had been found by appellant on the street or
,on the floor in a hotel, or in the public part of a banking institu-
1205 Ky. 234, 265 S. W. 612.
